AUSTIN, Texas — Texas ordered nearly $4.5 million in police phone surveillance equipment, including systems for four Chevrolet Tahoes. The purchase highlights a capability that reaches beyond the person investigators are trying to find.

Cell-site simulators can collect identifying signals from nearby phones, including devices belonging to people who are not investigation targets. The Justice Department explicitly acknowledges that bystander collection in its operating policy.

Meanwhile, an Oct. 7 procurement notice shows the New York Police Department pursuing a $750,500 contract for FalcoNet equipment and services. That is the same product family listed in Texas’ purchase.

However, collecting phone identifiers does not establish unrestricted access to a device’s private contents. NYPD’s published policy says its simulators do not capture emails, texts, photographs or contact lists.

The records nevertheless expose a significant privacy issue: Investigators can collect information from a phone even when its owner is not the person they are looking for.

What Texas purchased

The Texas Department of Public Safety’s March 4 purchase order authorizes a maximum of $4,487,500. It identifies Cognyte Software LP as the vendor and labels the transaction an emergency purchase.

The order includes four FalcoNet core systems totaling $2.85 million and four 5G licenses totaling $280,000. Four 2026 Chevrolet Tahoes account for another $600,000. Backpack equipment, antennas and other components make up the remaining cost.

The Drive reported on the purchase in July, publishing the order and related procurement documents. The records describe a specialized acquisition, not equipment installed throughout the state’s entire police fleet.

In its emergency justification, DPS cited missing-person searches, dangerous manhunts, suspect tracking and emergency response. The agency also said the systems would improve officer safety and coordination.

The memo warned that procurement delays could compromise public safety and operational readiness. However, it did not identify a particular missing person, manhunt or incident requiring the emergency purchase.

Together, the documents establish what DPS ordered and why it said the purchase was necessary. They do not establish where the systems have operated, how many deployments occurred or how many bystanders’ phones were encountered.

How police phone surveillance reaches bystanders

A cell-site simulator imitates a legitimate cellular tower. Nearby phones can respond because the equipment presents itself as an attractive network connection.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security explains that these systems can identify and locate devices using their unique cellular identifiers. Those can include numbers associated with the subscriber’s SIM card or the handset.

The connection exploits normal cellular network behavior. Consequently, the initial identifying exchange does not depend on a person clicking a suspicious link or handing an unlocked phone to an officer.

The Justice Department’s policy describes receiving identifying numbers from multiple devices before narrowing attention to a known target. When investigators seek an unknown device, the process can involve signaling information from “non-target devices in the target’s vicinity.”

In practical terms, the equipment may need to distinguish the phone investigators want from other phones nearby. That is how people outside the investigation can become part of the collection process.

The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department describes the same distinction in its public guidance. Its system sorts incoming identifying signals until it finds the targeted device, then rejects the others, according to the department.

Phone identifiers are different from phone contents

The phrase “access your phone” can obscure important differences between surveillance methods.

An identifier helps distinguish one cellular device or subscriber from another. Signal information can help investigators locate a device. Neither finding, by itself, establishes that officers have copied the phone’s photographs, read its encrypted conversations or obtained its passwords.

The broader technology category includes systems with different capabilities. Canadian cybersecurity guidance describes malicious uses involving communications interception, network manipulation and phishing. However, that general warning does not prove that a particular U.S. police installation performs those functions.

Boston’s official surveillance report, for example, says its simulator cannot collect communications content or stored phone data. It describes using signal strength and direction to help locate devices.

Those distinctions set the boundaries of what the public records establish. The documented bystander collection remains significant without assuming that every simulator can extract everything on a phone.

An Israeli supplier with U.S. police customers

Cognyte, the Israel-based supplier named in the Texas purchase, sells technology used in police phone surveillance. It also markets investigative tools to intelligence agencies.

In a March 25 announcement, Cognyte described an approximately $5 million contract with a major U.S. state law enforcement agency. It said its tactical signals-intelligence technology would support fugitive searches, missing-child cases and other field operations.

The company also said the customer assists smaller agencies across its state. However, Cognyte did not identify that customer, so the announcement does not independently establish that it referred to Texas.

The supplier’s nationality is relevant to the procurement. It does not, by itself, establish that Israel’s government operates the equipment or receives information collected by American police.

That separate question would require evidence about system access, data handling and contractual arrangements.

New York is pursuing FalcoNet equipment

The NYPD notice published Oct. 7 proposes a three-year contract with Cognyte Technology Inc. Its scope includes FalcoNet hardware and software, on-site training, warranty coverage and support.

The maximum value is $750,500, and the notice identifies the procurement method as sole source. The equipment and services would support NYPD’s Technical Assistance and Response Unit.

The notice lists an Oct. 15 public-comment deadline. It describes a proposed contract, not a completed award or a record of deployments.

Separately, NYPD’s February 2026 impact-and-use policy confirms that the department already uses cell-site simulators. It says the equipment helps locate missing people, abduction victims and criminal suspects.

The policy also says its simulators and associated software do not retain or record received information. These are the department’s stated operating safeguards; the procurement notice provides no independent audit of compliance.

Police phone surveillance extends beyond Texas

Records elsewhere show that both phone-tracking equipment and vehicle-mounted deployments predate the Texas purchase.

In Massachusetts, Boston’s 2023 surveillance report explicitly lists cell-site simulators among technologies deployed in police vehicles. It also describes investigative uses involving an armed-robbery suspect and an aggravated-assault suspect.

Boston’s report explains another method: comparing identifiers collected at several locations where a person is known to be present. That process can help investigators identify the device appearing at each location.

In California, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Atlas of Surveillance documents Fontana police acquiring two simulator vehicles from Jacobs Technology in December 2023. The database also identifies Florida Department of Law Enforcement purchases involving Nyxcell and a FalcoNet airborne simulator.

Separately, Florida’s official contracting database lists a $2.13 million FDLE order with Cognyte dated Oct. 23, 2024. Its public line items describe confidential hardware and software rather than naming the specific products. That limited description does not independently establish which FalcoNet configuration, if any, the order included.

In Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Examiner reported in September 2025 that Milwaukee police were upgrading equipment and extending a contract to $1.45 million through 2028.

Purchasing records quoted by the outlet said Milwaukee had used the equipment to assist agencies in Texas, Ohio and Michigan, as well as federal investigators. As a result, the location of an agency’s headquarters does not necessarily define the reach of its equipment.

These examples involve different vendors, acquisition dates and policies. They establish a broader national footprint, rather than one uniform surveillance system operating under identical rules.

Rules for police phone surveillance vary

DOJ’s policy generally requires a probable-cause warrant, subject to specified exceptions. It also restricts content collection and investigative use of nontarget data.

For known-device searches, the policy requires deletion once the device is located and at least daily. For unknown-device identification, it requires deletion once identification occurs and at least every 30 days. It also requires audits.

However, that departmental policy does not automatically govern every independently conducted state or local operation.

NYPD’s policy generally requires a search warrant. For qualifying emergencies, it allows earlier use but requires a warrant within 48 hours. It separately permits searches for missing or suicidal people without a warrant.

The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department also generally requires a warrant, with emergency exceptions. Its published rules prohibit targeting First Amendment activities and using the equipment for immigration enforcement.

Additionally, Los Angeles County says identifying an unknown device requires a subsequent warrant before investigators gather further information relevant to that identifier.

These policies address different stages of surveillance: authorization to operate, collection, subsequent investigation and retention. A warrant requirement does not mean only the target’s device will transmit information during the initial search.

Likewise, a promise to delete unrelated information addresses what happens after collection. It does not establish that bystanders’ information was never received.

Secrecy complicates public oversight

Public understanding of these systems has long depended on records requests, litigation and scattered purchasing disclosures.

In 2023, the American Civil Liberties Union released findings from an FBI records lawsuit. The organization said the records showed continued use of nondisclosure agreements when local agencies requested assistance involving FBI-owned simulators.

According to the ACLU, those agreements restricted disclosures about the equipment and its use, including information relevant to criminal proceedings. The organization argued that secrecy undermined judicial oversight and defendants’ ability to challenge investigations.

That history does not establish that the new Texas purchase carries identical restrictions. However, it demonstrates why purchasing records and general policy statements cannot answer every question about operational practices.

The Milwaukee reporting illustrates the value of more detailed records. Deployment logs described investigations involving shootings and homicides, but also entries with vague descriptions or redactions. The department told the Examiner that it uses supervisory oversight and obtains court orders in nonemergency cases.

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The unanswered questions concern everyone nearby

The Texas documents disclose spending and equipment. The New York notice discloses a proposed contract. Neither provides a public accounting of how many unrelated phones the newly purchased or proposed systems might encounter.

Further records would be needed to establish deployment locations, the number of nontarget identifiers collected and whether deletion requirements were met. They would also help establish what information remains in investigative reports after data is removed from the equipment.

Other unresolved questions concern access. Which personnel can operate the systems? Can vendors access operational information during support sessions? What records allow an outside reviewer to verify that restrictions were followed?

Those questions should not be mistaken for findings of misconduct. They identify what procurement documents and published policies leave unanswered.

Police phone surveillance can collect identifying information from people outside an investigation. For those bystanders, privacy protections depend on what happens to their information afterward and whether anyone verifies that agencies follow the rules.