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What the Army’s Investigation Reveals

• The Army concluded that failures across multiple layers of aviation safety — not one isolated mistake — caused the collision that killed 67 people.
• Two broken radio transmissions were identified as the most significant contributing factor, leaving the Black Hawk crew without critical information about Flight 5342’s landing path.
• The investigation raises a larger accountability question because it identifies systemic Army failures while describing no disciplinary action against individual leaders.

WASHINGTON — The Army’s investigation into the deadliest U.S. aviation disaster in more than two decades has reached a conclusion that goes far beyond blaming a pilot, an air traffic controller or one misunderstood radio call.

The system failed.

In a 50-page report obtained by Stars and Stripes and disclosed Thursday, Lt. Gen. Michael McCurry determined by a preponderance of the evidence that breakdowns across multiple layers of conflict management caused the January 29, 2025 collision between an Army UH-60L Black Hawk and American Eagle Flight 5342 near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

All 67 people aboard the two aircraft died — 60 passengers, two pilots and two flight attendants aboard the PSA Airlines CRJ700, plus the Black Hawk’s three Army crewmembers. The regional jet was operating as American Eagle Flight 5342 from Wichita, Kansas, to Washington.

The Army’s choice of language matters.

A “preponderance of the evidence” is the familiar more-likely-than-not evidentiary standard used in civil litigation and many administrative proceedings. Here, McCurry applied it not to a single catastrophic mistake, but to a chain of failures that accumulated until the margin for error effectively disappeared.

The Army identified two broken radio transmissions as the most important contributing factor. According to the NTSB, the Black Hawk crew did not clearly receive a controller’s warning that Flight 5342 was “circling runway 33.” Radio interference caused the critical word “circling” to be lost inside the helicopter.

That was only part of the problem.

The Army also cited inaccurate instruments, limited visibility while the helicopter crew operated with night-vision goggles, strong urban lighting, gusting winds, training deficiencies and broader shortcomings in aviation risk management. The investigation also identified maintenance issues, shortcomings involving ADS-B position broadcasting and the lack of collision-avoidance technology aboard many military helicopters.

Then there was the airspace itself.

The NTSB found that the helicopter route near Reagan National could leave as little as 75 feet of vertical separation between helicopters and airplanes approaching Runway 33. Its final investigation identified failures involving helicopter route design, air traffic control practices, FAA oversight, military risk management, data sharing and collision-avoidance technology.

That changes how this disaster should be understood.

This was not simply a case where one aircraft wandered into another aircraft’s path. The evidence points to overlapping safeguards that either failed, were inadequate or never existed. Radio communication degraded. Visual separation had limits. Technology that could have provided another warning layer was missing. The route itself permitted dangerously tight separation.

And the warning signs were not created that night.

The NTSB ultimately issued 75 findings and 50 safety recommendations, and Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy warned in July that many remained unresolved.

The Army says it has begun making changes, including additional training, inspections and technology improvements. It has also recommended examining military helicopter operations around other major metropolitan areas to determine whether Washington’s problems exist elsewhere. Reviews reportedly include Los Angeles and the Seattle-Tacoma region.

But one issue remains unsettled.

The Army report examines systemic causes while identifying no individual leadership discipline. Families of Flight 5342 victims are pressing for an independent Army Inspector General review, arguing that identifying institutional failure without examining leadership accountability leaves part of the investigation unfinished.

The distinction matters. Safety investigations are designed primarily to prevent the next crash. Accountability proceedings ask a different question — whether someone responsible for recognizing and controlling known risks failed to do so.

After 67 deaths, the government may ultimately have to answer both.

About the Author

Samuel López is a reporter and news correspondent for USA Herald who has written for the publication since 2022. López brings more than two decades of legal-sector experience analyzing state and federal litigation, evidentiary records, regulatory matters and complex factual disputes. His legal-analysis background informs his reporting on aviation investigations, government accountability and the distinction between what evidence proves, what investigators conclude and where questions remain unresolved.

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