Courts have the power to do more than impose monetary sanctions to ensure nobody benefits from discovery abuse and to ensure fairness of the proceedings, she added.
When Justice Liu asked for the definition of “any other provision” language in Section 2023.030, McCann replied that the language cannot refer to Section 2023.030 or Section 2023.010 because the phrase “to the extent authorized by” in Section 2023.010 doesn’t authorize the court to levy monetary sanctions.
“Any other provision” would mean any other provisions found in the six-step method-specific chapters for obtaining discovery under the Discovery Act, she explained.
Associate Justice Leondra Kruger asked McCann if she believed the trial court had the inherent authority to impose sanctions other than monetary penalties. McCann replied that it did but that the underlying dispute was only in its procedural stages and no other sanction was available to issue since the city dismissed its lawsuit against PwC with prejudice.
Monetary sanctions are a “different animal” than nonmonetary sanctions, and courts recognize that monetary sanctions must be authorized by a statute or through an agreement of the parties, which means that the California Legislature made the conscious decision not to give trial courts inherent authority to issue monetary sanctions without limits, McCann added.
