In March, U.S. District Judge Sarah Morrison handed down a ruling that the drilling rights exemption covered only the 80-acre tract. Undeterred, Long Point appealed this decision, arguing that the 1948 deed provided no indication that Freudiger intended to separate the two parcels of land. Long Point passionately asserted that the division was merely a legal construct for ease, as the language was lifted “verbatim” from the source deed.
“[Freudiger] copied the Source Deed’s description of the First Parcel, reflecting her intent to convey all of the First Parcel. She described it in two tracts simply because that was the legal description of the First Parcel on which her ownership rested,” Long Point eloquently argued.
A Riveting Legal Drama
In her judgment against Long Point, Judge Morrison opted not to compare the exemption language to a drilling rights reservation in a separate deed covering more of Freudiger’s land. She deemed this document inadmissible, considering it “extrinsic” evidence. However, Long Point implores the Sixth Circuit to reconsider that other deed, pointing out that its drilling rights exception mirrors the one in the 1948 deed.
