WASHINGTON — U.S. military planners have developed options to use the “mother of all bombs” against Iranian energy infrastructure and nuclear sites if President Donald Trump orders renewed combat operations, CNN reported.

Reuters carried the report Oct. 15, attributing the information to CNN and stating that it could not immediately verify it independently. The reporting describes contingency plans rather than an approved attack.

However, officials cited by CNN questioned whether the weapon could accomplish the administration’s military goals. Its potential use raises a consequential question: What would an exceptionally powerful surface blast achieve against a facility protected deep underground?

What CNN reported about Trump’s strike options

CNN’s report cited multiple U.S. officials familiar with the planning. Potential targets included Pickaxe Mountain, a site associated with Iran’s nuclear program.

One source described preparations for additional attacks before a possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. Other sources discussed the administration’s search for an operation that could help Trump present the conflict as concluded.

Nevertheless, those discussions do not establish that the president has selected a target or approved the weapon’s use. Nor do they demonstrate that another attack would produce a negotiated settlement.

Asked about the plans, a White House official declined to discuss sensitive military options and reiterated Trump’s opposition to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. A Pentagon official said the department prepares for a range of operational scenarios. Neither response publicly confirmed a specific MOAB mission.

What the “mother of all bombs” actually does

The weapon’s official designation is the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, commonly shortened to MOAB. “Mother of all bombs” is its nickname.

According to the Air Force Armament Museum, it weighs approximately 21,600 pounds and carries about 18,700 pounds of H6 explosive. It uses satellite and inertial guidance and is delivered from a C-130 aircraft.

Those figures describe two different quantities: the weight of the complete weapon and the explosive material inside it. Neither should be confused with explosive yield, which expresses the energy released in terms of an equivalent quantity of TNT.

The museum’s published specifications are consistent with an approximate yield of 11 metric tons of TNT. That is a conventional explosive effect; the MOAB is not a nuclear weapon.

Descriptions of the weapon as a device that sprays fuel into the atmosphere and then “sets the air on fire” go beyond what these technical records establish. The Air Force identifies H6 as its explosive filling and describes blast and fragmentation as its principal mechanisms of injury.

For readers assessing the proposed strikes, the more significant distinction concerns what the weapon was built to damage. A large explosive charge alone does not make a bomb capable of reaching every underground target.

A massive blast and a deep penetrator serve different purposes

Air Force documentation distinguishes the MOAB from the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP. The similar names can obscure substantial differences in their missions.

The Air Force’s handbook describes the GBU-57 as a 30,000-pound guided weapon designed to reach hardened, deeply buried facilities. It is heavier than the MOAB, although it carries a smaller quantity of explosive material.

An earlier handbook describes the MOAB’s purposes as attacking personnel and clearing obstacles. Consequently, calling either weapon simply the “biggest bomb” leaves out information needed to understand its capabilities. Total weight, explosive payload and ability to penetrate a target are separate characteristics.

That distinction already has a place in the history of U.S. operations against Iran. During the June 2025 operation known as Midnight Hammer, American B-2 bombers used GBU-57 penetrators against Iranian nuclear facilities.

A Pentagon account published by the Air Force described the use of those weapons at Fordo. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced their initial assessment of extensive damage. Those statements concerned a different weapon and operation from the MOAB option now under discussion.

The comparison helps explain why the proposed weapon deserves scrutiny. Demonstrating that a bomb can produce an enormous explosion does not establish that it can destroy equipment or chambers beneath substantial layers of protective material.

The Afghanistan strike provides limited precedent

The United States first used the MOAB in combat on April 13, 2017, during Trump’s first term. Its target was an ISIS-K tunnel complex in Afghanistan’s Achin district, in Nangarhar province.

In its announcement of that strike, the military said the operation aimed to destroy fighters and facilities while reducing risks to Afghan and American forces conducting clearing operations.

Gen. John Nicholson, then commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, described a defensive network involving improvised explosives, bunkers and tunnels. The military presented the bomb as a tool for overcoming those obstacles.

However, that precedent does not establish that every underground complex presents the same problem. The term “tunnel” can describe facilities with different depths, construction and protective features.

The relevant question for an Iranian target would therefore be the expected effect on that particular facility. A previous successful use against one defensive network cannot substitute for an assessment of another.

Psychological impact was part of the original design

The MOAB’s intimidating reputation has roots in official military planning.

A March 21, 2003, Air Force legal review anticipated a substantial psychological effect on people witnessing its use. The document discussed demoralizing enemy forces through the explosion’s size, cloud and noise.

It also identified military applications, including attacks on hardened-target entrances and surface targets, as well as clearing obstacles. The review did not describe the MOAB as a specialized deep-penetration weapon.

A psychological effect, however, offers a different measure of success from physically disabling a nuclear facility. An assessment would need to identify what an attack was intended to change and what evidence would demonstrate that change.

The administration has stated broader objectives for its Iran campaign. In a March explanation of Operation Epic Fury, the White House identified Iran’s missile capabilities, naval forces, support for armed groups and potential acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Those stated goals provide benchmarks for evaluating any additional operation. Damage to a particular military capability could be measured against them. The visual scale of an explosion would not, by itself, establish that those objectives had been met.

Civilian harm could extend beyond the explosion

The possible inclusion of energy infrastructure raises concerns that reach beyond the immediate target.

The International Committee of the Red Cross warns that explosive weapons with wide-area effects can damage surrounding civilian buildings and essential services when used in populated areas. Deaths and injuries may be followed by failures in electricity, water, sanitation and health care.

The organization urges armed forces to avoid using such weapons in populated areas unless sufficient measures can reduce their effects and the resulting danger to civilians. That is a general policy position, not an assessment of a specific proposed American strike.

Energy networks also connect facilities that may be far apart. For example, damage to an electricity supply can affect water pumping, sewage treatment and medical services beyond the area directly struck.

In its analysis of energy infrastructure during armed conflict, the ICRC explains that a facility may serve military and civilian users simultaneously. Separating those functions can be difficult within an interconnected network.

As a result, evaluating civilian harm requires examining what a facility supplies and who depends on it. The consequences may continue after the immediate attack has ended.

A weapon’s legality does not settle a strike’s legality

The Air Force’s 2003 review concluded that the MOAB, as described, complied with U.S. international legal obligations. However, it also required commanders to assess lawful targeting when authorizing its use.

The review therefore did not provide blanket approval for every possible target. It expressly left questions about an individual attack to the circumstances reasonably known at the time.

The ICRC’s current explanation of the laws governing the Middle East conflict identifies distinction, proportionality and precautions as central requirements.

Distinction requires separating military objectives from civilians and civilian objects. Proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage. Precautions require feasible measures to avoid or minimize civilian harm.

Energy infrastructure is generally civilian, the organization explains. A particular installation can become a military objective when it effectively contributes to military action and attacking it offers a definite military advantage.

Even then, its civilian functions remain relevant to the assessment. Classifying an installation as a military objective does not remove the obligation to consider foreseeable harm to people who rely on it.

Without details about an approved target and the expected consequences, the available reporting cannot establish whether a particular future strike would satisfy those requirements.

Trump’s election pledge leaves the timing unresolved

The report also follows Trump’s public statement that the United States would refrain from attacking Iran before the midterm elections.

On Oct. 8, Trump said he would not launch attacks before the Nov. 3 vote, citing discussions with Tehran. The Wall Street Journal reported his statement and his continuing insistence that Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon.

Preparing options does not, by itself, demonstrate that the president has abandoned that pledge. A decision to conduct an attack would be a separate development requiring confirmation.

Meanwhile, the economic consequences of the regional conflict remain relevant to American households and businesses. The Energy Information Administration has documented how international shortages can affect domestic diesel prices even when U.S. refineries are producing substantial amounts of fuel.

In a Sept. 18 analysis, the agency linked tight global diesel supplies to reduced refining activity in Russia, China and the Middle East. Higher overseas prices increased demand for U.S. exports while making imports more expensive.

The agency also identified trucking, rail transport, agriculture and home heating among the activities affected by diesel costs. These connections illustrate why additional damage to energy supply systems could have consequences beyond the country where an attack occurs. They do not establish a specific price increase from a strike that has not happened.

Related coverage: Trump Turns to Russian Diesel as Washington Eases Sanctions

What an announced operation would need to explain

Public disclosure of a strike decision would leave several questions requiring answers: What military objective was selected? Why was the MOAB considered suitable? What civilian harm was anticipated, and what precautions were taken?

An assessment after an attack would face a further question: Did the operation achieve its stated purpose?

Those questions follow from the weapon’s documented capabilities and the obligations governing its use. The appearance of a massive explosion would reveal the force of the detonation. Evidence about the target, damage and subsequent events would be needed to establish the military result.