WHAT'S INSIDE THIS REPORT

A closely watched attorney discipline case in California has raised fundamental questions about judicial impartiality — and whether a State Bar judge who made extensive findings about a lawyer's conduct in earlier proceedings can fairly preside when that same lawyer becomes the subject of his own disciplinary case.

At the center of the dispute is Los Angeles plaintiffs' attorney Paul Robert Keisel, whose case before the State Bar Court has become a proving ground for due process protections inside California's attorney discipline system.

By Samuel López | USA Herald

THE CASE AND THE PARTIES

The matter is formally captioned In the Matter of Paul Robert Keisel, State Bar Court, Case No. SBC-26-O-30207 (OCTC Case No. 23-O-13514).

Keisel is represented by Ray Boucher, Maria Weitz, and Michael Gorelik of Boucher LLP, alongside Mark Tuft and Jack Altura of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP — a formidable defense team. The Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC) has been represented by Peter A. Klivans, Eli D. Morgenstern, and other attorneys.

The disciplinary charges, filed February 25th, allege that Keisel participated in a scheme involving the filing and settlement of Jones v. City of Los Angeles, concealed material facts from courts and a mediator, and later made misleading statements in related litigation involving PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.

THE DISQUALIFICATION MOTION

On March 12th, Keisel moved to disqualify Hearing Judge Yvette D. Roland from presiding over his case. The motion argued that Judge Roland had already reached conclusions about his conduct while presiding over two related matters: In the Matter of Michael Jacob Libman, SBC-24-O-30064, and In the Matter of James Patrick Clark, SBC-24-O-30722.

Michael Libman, a well-regarded Los Angeles attorney who represented clients in the Jones v. City of Los Angeles litigation, is also challenging the fairness of California's attorney discipline system, arguing that the process suffers from structural due process deficiencies that can place attorneys at a severe disadvantage when facing disciplinary prosecution.

Both matters involve Judge Roland.

And both involve allegations that decisions made within the attorney discipline system raise serious questions regarding impartiality and due process.

The Libman matter resulted in a disbarment recommendation, while the Clark matter resulted in a recommended two-year suspension.

In Keisel’s case, Judge Roland declined to recuse herself. In a verified answer filed March 20th, she wrote, "Respondent does not contend that the undersigned judge has any bias or personal animus against respondent," and maintained that she could fairly decide the matter.

She further stated, "This court notes that it did not find, in either trial that Mr. Keisel's testimony lacked credibility." In both prior cases, Keisel had been called as a witness by State Bar trial counsel.

State Bar Court Judge Manjari Chawla subsequently denied the disqualification motion, finding that prior involvement in related proceedings did not create a reasonable appearance of bias and concluding that Judge Roland had not made adverse credibility findings against Keisel.

THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Keisel petitioned for interlocutory review. Presiding Judge Richard A. Honn granted a stay of proceedings on April 13th and requested briefing from both sides. After receiving the Bar's response, he allowed Keisel's attorneys to file a reply brief and submit an appendix exceeding the standard 150-page limit — a signal of the complexity and significance of the issues raised.

Keisel's attorneys argued that Judge Chawla applied the wrong legal standard and failed to account for the extent to which Judge Roland had already made findings about Keisel's conduct — findings that would directly overlap with issues she would be required to decide in his own disciplinary proceedings.

Bar counsel Klivans countered that Judge Chawla correctly denied the motion and that Keisel had failed to demonstrate either legal error or abuse of discretion. Klivans argued that Judge Roland's findings in the Libman and Clark matters concerned the parties in those cases, not Keisel himself, and emphasized that Keisel would have a full opportunity to defend himself in his own disciplinary proceedings.

Notably, the State Bar pointed out that the only explicit credibility finding Judge Roland made regarding Keisel was actually favorable — she found he had testified truthfully in the cases that produced the disbarment recommendation for Libman and the two-year suspension recommendation for Clark.

"Judge Roland's decisions in the Libman and Clark matters were opinions with respect to the parties in those matters, not with respect to respondent." Bar counsel stated.

THE MAY 27TH REPLY BRIEF

The most detailed statement of Keisel's position came on May 27th, when attorney Tuft filed a reply brief with the State Bar Court Review Department urging reversal of Judge Chawla's order. The filing directly challenges what it characterizes as the Bar's misreading of a critical fact.

"The fact that Mr. Keisel was not a party to the prior proceedings makes the case for disqualification stronger, not weaker because it deprived him of the procedural protections that ordinarily justify asking a judge to set aside prior impressions," the filing states.

The brief elaborates that a witness — unlike a party — lacks the ability to cross-examine other witnesses, control the presentation of evidence, present a defense, or otherwise influence findings that later become embedded in a written judicial decision.

Attorney Tuft further argued that Judge Roland's own written opinions described Keisel as a "central actor" and "not [a] neutral actor" in the alleged scheme. The brief contends that Judge Roland concluded Keisel had "conflicting loyalties to the city" and portrayed him as a willing participant in conduct involving moral turpitude. Those findings, the brief argues, go directly to the issues Judge Roland would be required to decide if she presides over Keisel's disciplinary proceedings.

The reply also raises what the defense characterizes as an impartiality problem: that Judge Roland has an institutional interest in remaining consistent with her earlier rulings.

"To rule in Mr. Keisel's favor on any material issue would require Judge Roland to repudiate the factual foundations of her own prior decisions in Libman and Clark," Keisel’s brief states.

On the question of Judge Chawla's reliance on Judge Roland's own assurances, the reply brief is pointed:

"The entire point of the objective standard is that a judge is not a reliable judge of her own impartiality."

The filing argues that Chawla improperly treated Roland's statements as effectively dispositive when assessing whether a reasonable observer would question her impartiality. It also renews constitutional due process arguments that the defense contends the Bar's May 4th response failed to adequately address.

Significantly, the brief asserts that the Bar "does not dispute that Judge Roland made adverse factual findings that go to the heart of Mr. Keisel's defense," and that OCTC "does not seriously contest that Judge Roland made sweeping adverse findings about Mr. Keisel's character."

Throughout the filing, Keisel's attorneys are careful to distinguish their argument from a claim of actual bias.

"Mr. Keisel emphasizes that the disqualification motion and this appeal were not brought lightly and he does not contend that Judge Roland harbors any personal animus or bias against him," the brief states.

Instead, his attorneys frame the question as one of objective appearance: "The question under section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) is not whether Judge Roland intends to be fair — it is whether a reasonable person aware of the facts would entertain a doubt."

WHAT COMES NEXT

For years, Michael Libman has argued that the attorney discipline system deserved greater scrutiny. Now, as Paul Kiesel presses his own challenge involving the same disciplinary judge and related underlying events, those arguments are receiving renewed attention.

Whether that attention leads to reform, vindication, or reaffirmation of the existing system remains to be seen. What is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore, however, is that the debate is no longer about one lawyer. It is about whether the institutions entrusted with policing the legal profession are themselves receiving the scrutiny that justice requires.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Samuel López is a Senior Legal Analyst, investigative journalist, and legal researcher with more than two decades of experience analyzing litigation, attorney discipline proceedings, government investigations, regulatory disputes, and complex legal controversies. Through USA Herald, he provides fact-driven analysis designed to help readers understand not only what happened, but why it matters.